Institute for Advanced Strategic

and Political Studies

IASPS Research Papers in Strategy

Succession in Saudi Arabia:
The not so Silent Struggle

By Paul Michael Wihbey

Introduction

What happens in Saudi Arabia deeply affects the smaller oil states of the Persian Gulf.  It also affects Iran, Iraq, the world oil markets, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the prosperity of Europe and Japan, and of course U.S. foreign policy.  Over the past five years a not so silent struggle has been taking place within the Saudi royal family.  While the immediate stakes are the fortunes of princes known beyond the kingdom’s borders only by specialists, in fact the future of Saudi Arabia itself and all the interests it touches have been at stake.  A closer look at the struggle’s outcome tells us what we can expect from the winners and losers.  More important, the succession struggle is worth examining because it laid bare the Saudi regime itself, with all its strengths, problems and proclivities.  Looking at it we learn how much and how little can be expected from Saudi Arabia.

Throughout its history, the Saudi royal family has sought stability and continuity above all else.  Even during the most tumultuous periods of transition and rivalry, the  family has understood that its hold on power is entirely dependent on unity and cohesion.

On March 1, 1992, King Fahd issued an edict clarifying the succession to the throne.[1]  Prior to this, the crown had passed to one of the thirty-five surviving sons of King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud, first king and founder of the modern state of Saudi Arabia, according to seniority and family consensus.  This had resulted in a smooth transfer of power over a period of six decades and four ascensions to the throne.[2]   The 1992 decrees  dramatically broadened the options for succession, set off a struggle, as well as intense speculation and prognostication by scholars, journalists, diplomats and other interested observers of Middle East affairs.[3]

The reasons for the tumult have as much to do with a radically changing domestic environment as it does with the extraordinary and intense competition between the incumbents to the throne, Crown Prince Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz and the Minister of Defense, Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz.  By 1997 Abdullah had clearly won.  But it remains to be seen whether he or anyone else could maintain the regime in the face of hardening divisions within the family as well as changing domestic and international circumstances.

The Vital Interest:

Sitting atop one-quarter of the world’s proven oil reserves, exporting 8 million b/d, supplying 1/6 of U.S. oil imports and the seventh leading purchaser of U.S. goods and services.[4] Saudi Arabia’s unique geo-strategic status has made it a pillar of U.S. strategic considerations since World War II.[5]  By 2000, the U.S. consumption of imported oil will rise from 45% (1999) to 56%.  The stability of western economies is inextricably tied to the uninterrupted supply of oil.  The three previous ‘shocks’ in the flow of supply (1973 Arab Boycott, 1978-79 Iranian Revolution, 1990-91 Iraq-Iran War) resulted in sharp price increases which impacted the West with higher consumer prices, increased unemployment and an overall decline in productivity.  Not surprisingly, whether under the rubric of a ‘special relationship’ or of collective security’ [6] , the United States has been the guarantor of the pro-American Saudi regime. [7]

This strategic partnership has been able to manage and contain external threats to the regime in a manner conducive to the mutual interests of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.8   However, in the aftermath of the Gulf war, increasingly militant Saudi constituencies inside and outside of the country have increasingly scrutinized, questioned and criticized the regime.  The Saudis must now deal with a host of challenges that will test the regime as never before.

1.                  Nature of the Regime Saudi Arabia is a coalition of tribes ruled by the Saudi dynasty through an absolute monarchy legitimized by the pronouncements of the orthodox Wahhabi sect.  To sustain the regime the king must retain the loyalty of the three most important pillars of the regime: the several thousand princes who constitute the House of Saud, the tribes, and the armed forces.  The king does this primarily by dispensing the wealth generated from oil.  Thus, Saudi kings have tamed chronic factionalism within the royal family, and governed by consensus, especially concerning important questions of state, such as succession.

           For over six decades, the resulting political cohesion of the regime and sense of national unity has bred an antipathy to any manner of political liberalization, but as was the case with Iran, under the Shah a host of social and economic forces outside the control of the regime have already begun to alter the nature of Saudi society. 

Hence, the King of Saudi Arabia bears an inordinate amount of responsibility in his quest for societal equilibrium, economic development and regional stability.  The recent struggle for succession offers an interesting insight into the matrix of forces that is helping define Saudi leadership, policy and priority.

2.                  Internal Pressures.  Internal threats may be more significant than the external.  The message of radical Islam has resonance, even in a conservative society like Saudi Arabia.  The Islamist opposition finds fertile ground in the crisis of the welfare state, widespread corruption and varied issues of modernization.  Divided into two broad constituencies, Islamist and secular/nationalist, the opposition movements share many of the same grievances: denial of basic political rights, the alliance with America, corruption and fiscal mismanagement.  The Islamists seem more strident and militant as they agitate for departure of American troops from Saudi soil, increased clerical participation in government and greater support for Islamic causes.  The secular/nationalists composed primarily of members from the middle, professional and intellectual classes, stress the need for basic human rights, greater economic opportunities, political mobility and an end to the repressive nature of the Saudi regime.  Within this rapidly emerging discontent, anger and militancy, can the Saudis effectively provide a semblance of political accountability, transcend the tribal underpinnings of the regime, and secure a more mature relationship between the governed and the House of Saud?

3.                  Restructuring the Economy.  Public expenditures have soared, even as massive military purchases continue and revenues decline.  Defense spending accounts for 30% of the official budget, while another 30% is defense related.  Heavy

subsidies--in effect payments for political support--account for most of the rest.  Public expenditures were reduced by 19% in 1994.  Can Saudi Arabia safely reduce further the high level of public spending?  Can the transition to privatization and market economy without the emergence of a new social contract provide Saudi citizens with a greater level of political participation even as their benefits from the welfare state are gradually diminished?  Can diversification provide a job market for an increasingly young, educated and unemployed Saudi population?

4.                  External Threats.  The most immediate dangers stem from Iraq and Iran.  Despite the U.S. policy of ‘dual containment’, both regimes seem to be secure and have so adapted themselves that either can disrupt the status quo.  Given increasing domestic resistance to the American connection, the failure to create a collective security system via the G.C.C., or a standing ground force with Egyptian and Syrian participation, can the Saudis find a new formula for a regional balance of power equation that does not rely exclusively on the deterrence of American military troops on Saudi soil?  Is there any set of interregional relations that can replace the current confrontational posture that the Saudis have been locked into since the Gulf war?

Domestic Unrest:

The domestic serenity and tranquillity of the last few decades has suddenly imploded, much to the consternation of U.S. policy-makers and their Saudi counterparts.9 Starting with the 1991 petition for government reforms that was submitted to King Fahd by Islamic intellectuals,10 Saudi domestic political affairs have been characterized by:

1.                  Militant Islamist Opposition.  In 1994, thousands of protesters, led by radical Islamic clerics, demonstrated against the pro-western policies of the Saudi government.  The rally which took place in the city of Buraida, 200 miles northwest of Riyadh, resulted in the imprisonment of the clerics and subsequent arrest of hundreds of suspected supporters throughout the country.11  The growth of an indigenous dissident Islamist movement has resulted in a continuing government campaign of detention, repression and denial;

2.                  High Profile Secular/Nationalist Critics.  Operating from the U.K. and the U.S., media conscious Saudi opposition groups have denounced the behavior of senior Saudi officials and questioned the legitimacy of the Saudi regime.  The two most active and influential groups are the London-based Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR) headed by a former physics professor, Mohammed Masari, and the Committee Against Corruption in Saudi Arabia (CASCA), based in Mclean, Virginia;12

3.                  Attacks Against Americans.13 The unprecedented terrorist bombings of U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia were each followed by scores of arrests, pushing much of the opposition underground;

4.                  Shiite Resentment.  In the aftermath of the terrorist bombings, Saudi security forces arrested numerous members of suspected Shiite subversive groups, the most notable being Sheikh Jafar al-Mubarak, suspected of being a leader of the pro-Iranian ‘Saudi Hezbollah’.14  The arrests have only served to exacerbate tensions between the government and the one million Saudi Shiites living in the oil-rich Eastern province, who claim discrimination in religious, civil and economic affairs.

Combining a burgeoning 3.5% annual population growth, an estimated 20-25% unemployment rate, a decline in real per capita income from $14,000 in 1982 to $4000 in 1994, a decrease in oil revenue from $116 billion in 1981 to $33 billion in 1995 and the very real prospects of flat or sliding oil prices, the threat of increased domestic terrorism and civil unrest to the stability of the regime should not be underestimated.

Power Struggle:

The American security guarantee does nothing to mitigate growing domestic stress and the buildup of economic pressures.

With the specter of the fall of the Shah of Iran and subsequent regional consequences looming over the House of Saud and its Western allies, the ascension of the next Saudi King and the decisions he makes will have a direct impact not only on his domain, but certainly on the region and much of the industrialized world.  Will the new King cooperate with the U.S. on the crucial issue of oil production and pricing?  Will the 35-40,000 American civilians and troops on Saudi territory be permitted to stay?  Will the quality and the depth of the U.S.-Saudi military and commercial relationship be reduced and enhanced?  Will Saudi Arabia hinder or encourage efforts at peace between Israel and the Palestinians?

When King Fahd issued the March 1992 edict on succession, he may have inadvertently initiated the most contentious and dangerous struggle for power since the founding of the state.  Until its resolution sometime in the fall of 1996, Saudi Arabia endured three years of an internecine conflict that bordered on assassination, palace coup and civil war.  The protagonists in the drama were Abdullah, the Heir Apparent,15 first deputy prime minister, commander-in-chief of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), and Prince Sultan,16 second deputy prime minister and after Fahd, the eldest of the ‘Sudairi Seven’ brothers.17  Named after their mother, Hussah Bint Al-Sudairi, the favorite wife of Ibn Saud, the seven full brothers--Fahd, Sultan, Turki (Ex-Vice Minister of Defense), Salman (Governor of Riyadh province), Ahmad (Vice-Minister of Interior), Nayef (Minister of Interior) and Abdul Rahman (Vice Minister of Defense)--represent what is arguably the most powerful single faction within the Royal Family, the Al-Sudairi.

Unlike the Sudairi Seven who are generally regarded as ‘progressives’, unflinchingly pro-American and driven by the accumulation of wealth, Abdullah is  a traditionalist, a nationalist and is respected for both piety and integrity.18  In general, it may be said that the ‘progressives’, led by Fahd and Sultan, are committed to the American alliance, rapid modernization and economic development, and high rates of oil production to moderate pricing.  ‘Traditionalists’, led by Abdullah, believe in a less overt relationship with the U.S., resistance to westernization, greater economic diversification and less statism.

Abdullah’s status as heir apparent was never seriously in question until Fahd issued the royal edict, which effectively opened the succession process on two new fronts.  According to the edict, the King has the power to appoint or dismiss his heir apparent, based on suitability rather than seniority.  The edict also makes the grandsons of Abdul-Aziz eligible for the throne.  The leading figures among these ‘Second Generation’ princes include: Prince Bandar, his brother Khalid, Mohammed (son of Fahd and governor of the Eastern Province), Prince Saud (son of King Faisal and foreign minister), his brother Turki (chief of Foreign Intelligence), Lt. Gen. Sultan (son of Prince Salman), and Mitab (son of Abdullah).  The effect on Abdullah was jolting; not only would some 10-20 princes now be eligible for consideration, but the discreet, collegial forum of consensus formulation now lay open to blatant political machinations.  Not surprisingly, his rivals, primarily Sultan and Salman,19 seized upon the opportunity to place another Sudairi on throne, and  to create a new dynasty based upon maternal lineage.

The next three and one/half years were marked by an uncharacteristic array of plots, conspiracies and shifting alliances within the royal family.  However, during this period, Abdullah’s administrative acumen, especially in fiscal and budgetary matters, so impressed itself upon an ailing King Fahd, that by the time Fahd suffered a serious stroke in November of 1995, Abdullah had become the de facto head of state.  The Borgia-like court intrigue then culminated in a serious and dramatic turn of events.

Disturbed and desperate, Sultan resorted to direct confrontation amounting to a kind of coup d’etat:

1.                  While Abdullah was at a summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Oman (December 1995) Sultan summoned members of  the Ulema (The Supreme Religious Authority) to seek their sanction of his claim to the throne and to dismiss Abdullah as Commander in Chief of the National Guard, thereby preventing Abdullah’s return to the country.20  Recognizing Sultan’s gambit as a blatant attempt to seize power under the guise of religious approbation and in order to avert civil war, the Ulema denied Sultan’s petition.

2.                  In the aftermath of the failed coup, Sultan was rumored to be plotting against Abdullah’s life.  Abdullah then traveled to Al-Qissim, center of the powerful Shammar confederation of tribes.  Amidst reports of an imminent attack on his personal entourage, Abdullah challenged his fate by walking in the open and participating in ceremonial tribal dances demonstrating traits of courage and defiance that were not lost upon his rivals and allies.21  He got the tribes’ support.

3.                  In addition, Abdullah ordered the National Guard’s well trained, loyal and near-fanatical Bedouins to engage in highly visible military maneuvers.22  If Abdullah was going to be deposed as heir apparent, it would have taken a civil war to do it.

These events had an immediate and sobering impact on King Fahd and the family elders.  The prospect of Abdullah’s national guard engaging the somewhat less-resolute but better equipped regular Saudi armed forces was intolerable.  On January 1, 1996, Fahd nipped the emerging crisis in the bud by announcing that because of ill health he was temporarily transferring the powers of  state to Abdullah.  It is quite conceivable that under family pressure to resolve the conflict, Fahd took the unusual decision as an ‘objective’ test to determine Abdullah’s fitness to rule.23  By passing judgment while still alive, Fahd would convey a clear and irrevocable decision as to which of the two contenders would succeed him on the throne.

In the event, Abdullah’ s fifty-two day (Jan. 1-Feb. 21) regency was characterized by careful deliberation and continuity of policy.  His handling of the budget, amicable discussions with U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, and continued support and encouragement of the Majlis al-Shura did not go unnoticed.  In response to signals of friendship and cooperation with America, the State Department declared that, “in terms of the kingdom and its governance, we think it’s in good and stable hands.”24

The Next Administration:

Although Abdullah’s status as future King had been secured, the ensuing months saw a round-robin series of discussions, negotiations and alliances that were required to complete the succession process by giving form to the forthcoming Abdullah government.  Among the more interesting changes expected are:

1.         Formal transfer of the Prime Ministership from Fahd to Abdullah.  Fahd thus effectively removed himself from power without the need to abdicate, and provided Abdullah with the reins of government.  Meanwhile, he satisfied the Sudairis’ demand for real executive power by making Sultan first deputy prime minister in addition to Sultan’s new status as Crown Prince;

2.         Abdullah’s second son, Mitab, as the true, effective leader of the national guard.  This will probably be Abdullah’s most significant appointment with implications and consequences at several different levels.  Trained at Sandhurst,  Lt. Gen., Mitab is regarded as a knowledgeable and highly competent commanding officer with strong professional ties to the U.S. military.  There is little doubt that Mitab will aggressively pursue modernization programs aimed at improving and expanding the Guard’s capabilities in counter-insurgency, intelligence gathering and tactical field operations.  Although the national guard is configured to deal with threats to internal security, it is highly likely that under Mitab’s guidance the SANG will more closely resemble a conventional hi-tech ground force replete with MBTs, heavy artillery and heliborne units.  Such a development would provide Abdullah with a powerful counter-weight to the combined forces of the Sudairi-controlled ministries of interior and defense.  The SANG expansion would not only strengthen checks and balances within the royal family, but it could well become the impregnable bastion for a subtle but potent assault on the political ambitions of the Sudairis.  Under his father’s tutelage, the politically astute Mitab has cultivated a network of powerful regional political and military leaders that have included King Hussein of Jordan and the late Turkish prime minister, Torgut Ozal.  A low political profile, conservative personal behavior and commitment to his father’s doctrine has placed Mitab in position to emerge as the leader of the “second generation” princes should he choose to do so.  As the older generation dies off and if the Sudairis continue to alienate important constituencies, Mitab could position himself to exploit the new rules of succession to his advantage.  With a strong military and tribal power base, the support of key factions of  the royal family, acquiescence of Islamists and a royal legacy from his father, Mitab may silently and without fanfare emerge as the new Saudi dauphin;

3.         Increased authority and status for foreign minister Saud Al-Faisal, and chief of intelligence Turki-Al-Faisal.  Both brothers are highly regarded and have been loyal allies to the Crown Prince.  In return, Saud will coordinate the relationship with the United States and Europe, while Turki’s responsibilities may include developing Saudi policy to the new Islamic states of Central Asia, as well as enhanced intelligence and security powers;

4.         Abdullah loyalists as new ambassadors to Washington and London.  The new king will not hesitate to appoint his own men to the two most important and sensitive Saudi diplomatic posts.  The fact that Prince Bandar, long since an institution in Washington, D.C., has already signaled his desire to move on to new horizons and his somewhat cool relationship with the Clinton Administration will greatly facilitate change;

5.         Increased recognition, both politically and financially, to the majority of the 4-5000 princes (HH) of the House of Saud who have chafed against the inner circle power structure of the sons and grandsons (HRH) of Abdul-Aziz.25 Although often overlooked, the ‘lesser’ princes constitute the great majority of the Royal Family.  Because of the Sudairis’ strong control over financial and political patronage, many of the princes have felt alienated and resentful. By well as securing greater consensus for decisions that may break with certain family traditions and customs.  By co-opting the good will of the lesser princes, it is likely that Abdullah will secure greater consensus for decisions that may break with certain family traditions and customs.

6.         The Ministry of Defense will probably go to Sultan’s brother, Abdul Rahman, thereby enabling Sultan to fulfill his new responsibilities as Crown Prince.

Policy Orientation and Objectives:

Abdullah’s tenure as king will certainly be a transitional phase for a regime which will be entering the twenty-first century without ever really having passed through the twentieth.  Abdullah’s goal, of course, is to make sure that the country is not destabilized, and that the status, power and prestige of the House of Saud is secured.  Although Abdullah will have little influence on the Sudairis’ inner sanctum of Defense, Interior and unrestricted government based-business dealings, it seems likely that he will have full control over foreign policy and the pace and manner of domestic political and economic reforms.  Perhaps above all he will have his own army and a firm political base in the tribes.  In order to assure the continuity and security of the regime, Abdullah’s rule will probably be characterized by three major policy goals.

First, as a nationalist and pious Muslim, Abdullah has the credibility with Islamist and tribal constituencies to redress their grievances and secure their support for new mechanisms aimed at a fairer distribution of power.  The consensus and support of such groups could provide the impetus for the expansion of the institutions of civil society,26 thereby laying a foundation for democratization.  Second, with his well-known support of the Arab cause and rejection of Western influences, Abdullah, more than any other senior Saudi official can enhance the Saudi-U.S. strategic relationship without aggravating opposition groups inside the kingdom.  Third, to make the economy less dependent on oil, he will try to expand the agricultural, petrochemical and light manufacturing sectors in an attempt to diversify the economy and create a job market.  Abdullah will also try  to encourage the private sector, to open competition, reduce public spending and apply market principles.

I.          Political Reforms:

Any effort to neutralize the growing influence of dissidents, whether Islamist or secular/nationalist, will require Abdullah to confront the need for genuine political reform and the onerous problem of high-level corruption.  More than any other domestic issues, the lack of accountability over public funds has fueled the growth of the Saudi dissident movement.

Political reform is the prerequisite to any serious effort to impact the massive corruption practices that have been effectively institutionalized during Fahd’s reign.  No longer satisfied with the minimum $10,000 a month stipend, handsome government salaries and a host of princely perks and privileges, many senior Saudi princes have boosted their incomes by engaging in business activities that are at best, unethical and at worst, simple extortion or plunder.  Some of the most egregious behavior include the seizure of royal lands and recycling them for sale on the private market, the establishment of shell companies to bypass U.S. anti-corruption laws, and the imposition of princes as ‘brokers’ for private Saudi companies seeking to do business with foreign corporations.  The exorbitant profits, commissions and kick-backs resulting from such behavior, as well as lavish lifestyles subsidized by the state, has only served to give credence to charges that as much as one-third of government revenue never reaches the Saudi treasury.27

As King, it is likely that Abdullah would favor investing the 61-member Majlis al-Shura with authority for fiscal accountability over public funds and greater freedom of expression and assembly in its deliberations.  Extending similar responsibilities to the 13 regional councils, made up from the leaders of influential tribes and local families, would provide Abdullah the most effective platform to target the profligacy and corruption of many senior princes.  By adopting a coherent program of reform, curtailing the Saudi obligation for massive arms purchases from the U.S., and launching an anti-corruption drive through the application of Islamic law, the Shari’a, Abdullah could succeed in neutralizing the dissidents or possibly even securing their allegiance.  By introducing a style of governance reminiscent of the austere but respected King Faisal and colored by the political incrementalism of Jordan’s King Hussein, Abdullah would begin the regime’s long overdue shift away from political stability solely based on dispensing oil revenues to a stability based on political participation, dialogue, and broad national consensus.

However, until such time that Abdullah has the capacity to empower the middle class, intellectuals, and Islamists, he will be fiercely resisted by the Sudairi establishment and their vested interests.

Ultimately, only the accumulated political clout and the administrative capacities of a reinvigorated Majlis augmented by Abdullah’s base of support in the National Guard and amongst the tribes has any serious prospect of peacefully altering the balance of power within the Royal Family in favor of reform.  Anything less would simply result in the continuation of the political status quo thereby inviting greater opposition, dissidence, and domestic unrest, or alternately a violent intra-family confrontation with unforeseeable consequences for the House of Saud and regional stability.

II.        Foreign Policy: Strategy and Issues

Quite apart from his emotive attachment to pan-Arab ideals, the direction and substance of Abdullah’s foreign policy is driven by the need to enhance the security of the Saudi regime by providing a viable alternative to Saudi dependency on the United States.  Three distinctive sets of personal and political convictions define Abdullah’s geo-strategic vision: 1) balance of power, 2) military capability, and 3) linkage of religious values to foreign policy.

[Balance of Power]

Recent initiatives undertaken by Abdullah seem to confirm his predilection for a regional balance of power among Arab and Islamic states.  Implicit is the rejection of  American ‘comprehensive’ regional approaches to peace, security, and economic integration.  Believing that the American policy of dual containment against Iran and Iraq has failed and that the United States is neither able nor willing to aggressively pursue the stalled peace process, Abdullah held an unprecedented meeting with Iranian President Rafsanjani at the March, 1997, Islamic summit in Pakistan.  While both leaders agreed to visit each other’s countries in the near future, the real significance of the meeting was the Saudi signaling of their recognition of an eroding U.S. security regime in the Middle East.  The perceived devolution of the American posture combined with a steady slide in oil prices has left the Saudis, and Abdullah in particular, with little choice other than to devise a new regional system of alliances centered upon a modus vivendi with arch-rival Iran.

[Military Capability]

The essential component to any successful formulation of balance of power is, of course, a strong and effective military.  Clearly, the Crown Prince is in the process of changing the National Guard from a relatively small paramilitary force augmented by tribal levies, into an offensive-minded mobile fighting force composed of powerful armored and mechanized units manned by loyal and well-trained soldiers.  The transformation of the National Guard dedicated to the protection of the House of Saud and its oil installations into a rapid reaction force rivaling, if not surpassing, the regular Saudi army is a message to Abdullah’s opponents, both domestic and internal.

[Religious Values]

Unlike previous dubious Saudi initiatives to promote an Islamic political and diplomatic agenda through multilateral organizations like the Muslim League and the Organization of Islamic Conferences, both Abdullah and his longstanding ally, Foreign Minister Saud, will probably undertake a more nuanced approach to promote Islamic values on behalf of Saudi national security.  New opportunities for the extension of Saudi influence at the bilateral and regional levels are presenting themselves in Central Asia, the Balkans, and the Muslim communities of Southeast Asia.

Bilateral Issues:

[United States]

Probably the most immediate foreign policy issue facing Abdullah is Saudi Arabia’s status as an American client state.  Islamist dissidents have been particularly effective in validating the suspicions of large numbers of local constituencies, that the country is little more than a cash cow for the United States.  Not only does the United States have a captive market for the purchase of billions of dollars of military and commercial products, and manipulates global oil pricing via the Saudis’ swing position in OPEC, but the deployment of U.S. troops in the Kingdom and the Gulf contributes to the regional de-stabilization that in turn justifies their presence.28

Sensitive to such arguments and to the resulting corrosive effect on the legitimacy of the Royal Family to govern, Abdullah will most likely project a Saudi First sense of national security priorities by speaking publicly in nationalist or Islamic terms, while assuring the Americans of his intention to fully cooperate on issues of common interest. 

Such a balancing act between foreign commitment and internal cohesion will probably be characterized by:

!         Further significant increases in the size, readiness and capability of SANG.  (The purpose being to restore a sense of national pride in a Saudi “fighting force” with the ability to initiate combat action without having to wait for U.S. military intervention and support);29

!         a more deliberative and selective approach in accepting appeals from Washington to engage in large multi-billion dollar purchases of American products;30

!         a continuation or possible increased resistance to further U.S. troop deployments and pre-positioning;31

!         a more formalized or structured manner for high-level U.S.-Saudi meetings, especially on sensitive issues;32

!         opposition to any sort of U.S. or Israel sponsored “Middle East Development Bank”.

Dramatic changes in Saudi Arabia’s position towards Israel are unlikely.  Abdullah has been consistent in calling for a just and comprehensive peace, with Jerusalem as the capital of an independent Palestinian state.  Nevertheless, there are indicators of a more conciliatory and constructive orientation towards the Jewish state.

Key Abdullah allies and top advisors, including Foreign Minister Saud and Sheik Abdullaziz Al-Tuweijri, deputy chief commander of the National Guard, have hosted important American-Jewish organizational delegations in Saudi Arabia.  On these occasions, the Saudis not only expressed support for the peace process and extended condolences upon the death of Prime Minister Rabin, but more significantly, rejected the notion that Israel is a colonial interloper in the Middle East and seemed to recognize that  Israel is the national home for the Jews.33  Recently, Abdullah expressed his impatience with the stalled peace talks:

“The Saudi crown prince called on the sponsors of the peace process to remove the obstacles to a just and comprehensive peace, so that the countries of the region can devote their time to implementing  development and welfare plans for their populations.”34

Abdullah’s most serious weakness in foreign policy may well stem from his seemingly outdated and romantic commitment to pan-Arabism.  As defined by secular-nationalist Arab regimes, pan-Arabism has proven to be a bankrupt political ideology unable to overcome the realities of tribalism and sectarianism.35  Nevertheless, motivated by an underlying sense of honor to the nobility of the Arab cause, Abdullah bestowed his personal friendship as well as billions of Saudi dollars on Saddam Hussein during the eight-year war with Iran.  But when Saddam invaded Kuwait and sent his troops across the border into Saudi Arabia, Abdullah felt personally betrayed.36  It was not surprising, therefore, that it was Abdullah’s national guard forces who were largely responsible for ousting the Iraqis from Saudi Arabia in the battle of Khafji.37  Abdullah has taken the position that the suffering of the Iraqi people stemmed from the actions of Saddam and that Baghdad should fully carry out the resolutions of the UN Security Council.38  Still, this bitter experience has not weaned Abdullah from pan-Arabism.  Since he is married to a Lebanese whose sister is wife to Rifaat Assad, brother of the Syrian president, Abdullah has a personal link to the Syrian leadership.  Although troubled by the Tehran-Damascus entente, Abdullah’s benign attitude to ‘brotherly’ Syria may have been used against him to facilitate the access of Iranian-backed Syrian operatives into Saudi Arabia seeking to create havoc in the Saudi-U.S. relationship by targeting U.S. assets.  In March, a Saudi militant was arrested in Canada for alleged involvement with the June 1996 Tehran truck bombing that killed 19 U.S. servicemen.  Canadian authorities have concluded that the suspect is linked to Hezbollah and Syria.  Any substantiation to these reports would at the very least cause acute embarrassment for Abdullah, while potentially causing serious harm with key family rivals and the American administration.39

[Jordan]

Regardless of King Hussein’s ties to Israel, it was the active intervention of the Saudi Crown Prince that forged a renewal of relations between Jordan and Saudi Arabia. When Fahd refused to meet Hussein during the latter’s pilgrimage to Mecca in February 1996, because of Jordan’s pro-Iraqi stance during the Gulf war, it was Abdullah in his capacity as regent who greeted the Jordanian monarch.  The two discussed bilateral and regional issues, including the peace process and Iraq.  Both leaders sought to close the five-year gap in redressing grievances and reviving already signed protocols.  As a consequence, King Hussein extended an official invitation to Abdullah to visit Jordan in May 1996.  In August, Hussein again visited Saudi Arabia, only this time to be warmly received by Fahd in his palace at Jeddah.  A number of bilateral agreements were agreed upon, including the resumption of Saudi officers training in Jordan, Saudi financial support for various Jordanian projects and enhancing security and economic cooperation.  Jordanian prime minister Kabariti spoke of “building bridges of mutual trust.”40  Although the current Saudi ambassador to Amman is a Sudairi family member, it is clear that it was Abdullah’s initiative with Hussein in February that laid the groundwork for the successful resumption of normal bilateral relations.

Abdullah’s orientation towards a regional system of alliances to replace an eroding U.S. security regime in the Middle East may be the most interesting and significant development undertaken when the crown prince inherits the throne. 

Conclusion:

Finally, the effort to attain a high level of political cohesion through the cultivation of consensus and solidarity within the ruling echelons of the royal family may be problematic.  The barely concealed antagonism between Prince Sultan and the Sudairis towards Abdullah may be too great to overcome with traditional appeals for unity.  The possibility of the division of the House of Saud into two opposing and hostile camps with different doctrines of governance may be the most serious threat to the Kingdom. The first year of Abdullah’s reign will, in all likelihood, determine whether the new monarch will devote his energies to modernization within and alliances abroad or whether the regime will come under assault from forces within.

Dynamic Saudi religious, social and economic forces are beginning to interact in a manner that may bring unexpected and adverse consequences to U.S. interests in the region.  Traditional American working assumptions about Saudi Arabia’s political stability, economic well-being and social cohesion need serious reevaluation.  The United States ‘lost’ Iran, and later Iraq, because short-sighted policy makers relied on the absolutism of the Iranian and the Iraqi regimes to safeguard American commercial and security interests.  Unless the new Saudi leadership,  with support from the United States, applies the lessons emanating from the debacle of Iran and Iraq in terms of political and economic reforms, Saudi Arabia may be pulled into the vortex of regional turmoil.  The United States ignores Saudi domestic issues at its own peril.