IASPS Op-Eds
Comments on the Decline of a Nation-State
May 2, 2000
NOTE: This article originally appeared in the Jerusalem Post on May 2, 2000
The Best Chance for Peace
by Shmuel Cohen and William R. Van Cleave(May 2) - Late this March, the prestigious Times of London reported that Israel is considering a plan to install neutron warhead landmines along the border of the Golan Heights to halt a Syrian invasion. Were a peace treaty to be consummated, implementation of this plan, called "David's Sling," seemingly would provide Israel with high assurance that attacking Syrian armored units quickly could be put out of action as they reached the new border.
The alleged Israeli plan, in principle, seems very sensible. Practically any kind of battlefield nuclear defense, especially the neutron one, is vastly more effective in blunting and defeating an enemy attack than any kind of conventional defense, even with the most advanced technology.
Unlike conventional weapons, however, the use of nuclear weapons, even of the most discriminate variety, is generally held by Western countries to be "politically incorrect." This applies to the United States, which almost a decade ago, set about destroying American tactical nuclear weapons, including the neutron weapons.
Even Israel, which has suffered terrible damage in past wars of survival with its Arab neighbors, has held such qualms and generally has treated nuclear weapons as a last resort to prevent its annihilation. Regarding "David's Sling," a senior defense advisor to former prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu (hardly a military "dove"), is quoted as saying, "I hope we never have to reach that point. It would be horrible." But would it be horrible if this purely defensive plan ensured the security and integrity of Israel?
There are problems with the Times' report, however. Either the Israeli government has miscalculated in planning a nuclear border defense as described by the Times, or the Times (deliberately or inadvertently) has grossly distorted what a sensible and optimal neutron bomb defense should be.
In view of the high reputation of the Times and the unquestionably high competence of Israeli planners in defending their highly vulnerable country (plus one of the authors having spent many years developing and studying applications, including border defense, of the neutron bomb), we would guess that the Times' accounting is purposely incorrect, both technically and militarily.
Perhaps certain Israelis, having heard something about "David's Sling," for political reasons leaked the concept allegedly under consideration in an attempt to discredit it.
In employing neutron warheads, the proper and most defensive utilization is to have them burst relatively high off the ground in order to (a) maximize the radius of radiation effectiveness against invading enemy troops, and (b) minimize the civilian structural damage in the area and virtually eliminate any meaningful radioactive contamination at the surface.
To use them as part of a border minefield as reported by the Times, on friendly soil, would defeat the very purpose of such weapons. Detonation at or just below the surface would substantially reduce the radius of military effectiveness and at the same time, even at such a low warhead yield, produce extensive areas of long-lasting radioactive contamination.
This would make no sense militarily and civilians on both sides of the border would suffer.
The proper approach would be to use the warheads in short-range mobile ballistic missiles and artillery, which readily could cover the border and would burst over Syrian, not Israeli, soil. Considering how short the border would be, a few tens of miles, depending on the specifics of the peace treaty, such a defensive system not only would be extremely effective but would also involve a minimum missile capability and a sharply reduced investment in precious nuclear materials.
If Israel could get around the political/emotional obstacles surrounding the offensive or defensive use of any nuclear weapon, it could yield to Syria's demands and relinquish the Golan Heights with far less security risk (not that the authors favor relinquishing the Golan under any security arrangement).
For Israel not to develop a neutron bomb defense along the lines proposed here, in our view, would result in prolongation of the frustrating talks with increasing pressure on Israel to forego prudent security measures, or in the loss of the Golan with unacceptable security risk, and in the long run still another war with Syria.
Logic would seem to favor employment of the neutron bomb defense option by Israel. However, in an age of nuclear weapons, logic seems seldom to have prevailed in the Western world.
Nevertheless, at the very least, the subject discussed here should be seriously considered and even made part of diplomatic discourse, especially between Israel and the US.
(Cohen is a retired nuclear weapons analyst who invented the neutron bomb. Van Cleave is co-director of the Division for Research in Strategy in the Washington, DC office of Jerusalem's Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies.)