The War is Over
by Zev Golan, IASPS Associate Director

All the Israeli media reported on the morning of March 28 that 35 Israelis had been injured in a series of terror attacks the day before. That morning, before most Israelis had had time to read the morning paper, the radio was already reporting on another attack in which 3 people were killed, and a bomb found in Netanya. The morning papers were still carrying the story of a Jewish baby picked out for death by a Palestinian sniper the day before. With all this gore, it may seem like a non-sequitur to say that what the media should have said is: 35 injured; the war is over. But this is not a non-sequitur. The latter statement is the logical conclusion of the former. 

In fact, it is what the papers reported, though they used other language. Ha’aretz said: “Israel will refrain from responding till after the Arab summit in Amman.” It quoted defense sources saying “there are no magical solutions.” It said the defense ministry was looking into easing restrictions on Arab areas where there were no attacks. It said the Sharon government was considering whether to declare the PA an “enemy” which would “allow” Israel to initiate combat.  

On television, Israeli viewers could watch Minister for Internal Security Uzi Landau, an ex-hawk, explain why there would be no immediate response. They could watch Likud representative Danny Naveh explain why Israel shouldn’t respond. They could watch Prime Minister Sharon say Israel would know how and when to respond. They could listen to Likud leaders (excepting Education Minister Limor Livnat and Communications Minister Ruby Rivlin, who called for a response) explain that an Israeli response would play into the hands of Arafat, who wants Israel to hit him hard, and in any case, an Israeli response would only encourage more Arab attacks, and “who knows how many Palestinians will become terrorists” because of the suffering an Israeli response will entail? 

Many viewers may have wondered whether Prime Minister Barak put on a little weight, lost some hair, and there he was, still prime minister, now dressed as Ariel Sharon, explaining why Israel can’t hit back no matter what happens, but “Israel will know what to do and when to do it and how to defend herself.” 

The Institute often refers to the need for deterrence in international relations. One doesn’t need to be a military strategist or professor of political science to know the importance of deterrence. Israel long ago dropped deterrence as a policy. Some say Israel’s abandonment of deterrence began in the Gulf War, when Prime Minister Shamir chose not to respond to Saddam’s missile attacks. Surely during Barak’s regime, the lack of deterrence reached new depths. Israel retaliated for the lynching and dismembering of two soldiers by warning the enemy force to evacuate a building and then blowing a hole in the second story of that building. Two soldiers, one hole. Tit for tat? 

Then, during four months of unceasing Arab murders of Jews, came the famous “We will know when…how…” statements that could be called the Barak doctrine of defense: Speak loudly and carry no stick. 

But we have now progressed one step further. Israel cannot respond to PA sniper fire at babies because the Arabs are meeting two days later in Amman and may…condemn Israel? recall already-recalled ambassadors? expel already-expelled Israeli journalists? call for an economic boycott?  

Israel cannot respond immediately to three suicide bombers blowing up buses because…it may encourage other Arabs to become suicide bombers. 

So deterrence is at play in the Mideast today. Yasser Arafat and his gang of killers has built a successful deterrence policy against Israel. Israeli leaders are afraid to strike before an Arab summit, during the summit and after the summit. They are afraid to hit the enemy because they say the enemy wants to be hit; they are afraid to take steps that will affect any Arab not directly involved in an already-committed act of terror because they are afraid other Arabs will commit acts of terror. Mr. Sharon, like Mr. Barak before him, is afraid of his own shadow, and it seems that Israel hasn’t even the courage to identify the enemy. In this case, the fear seems not to be of the PA’s response to being declared an enemy, but of the implications this would have for Israel itself. Israel would have to admit the failure of the peace process (meaning it would among other things have to forego US aid and develop an independent economic and foreign policy) and, it would have to react to terror attacks and it would have to hit the enemy. For that, it would have to not be deterred; it would have to have courage.