Israel's
Forgotten Friend
By Ilan Berman and Paul Michael Wihbey
With so much
international attention being given to the current crisis between Israel and
the Palestinians, the decision to postpone long-anticipated naval exercises
with the United States, Turkey and Israel has passed largely unnoticed. But
the cancellation is a major move, reflective of Ankara’s anxiety about the
Israeli-Turkish relationship. Both Jerusalem and Washington, focused on
quelling the current unrest in the West Bank and Gaza and resuscitating the
Middle East peace process, have ignored the significance of Israel’s
increasingly unstable relations with Turkey, a development with major
implications for the region as a whole.
In recent
months, Ankara, traditionally an American and Israeli ally, has begun to
deepen bilateral relations with Baathist regimes in Syria and Iraq. In early
November, Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Syrian Vice-President
Abdel-Halim Khaddam signed a framework agreement calling for the resolution
of all outstanding disputes between the two countries, including water
rights, security and borders. This agreement is intended to serve as the
basis for expanded cooperation, with additional accords expected in
December. Such an entente, hardly thinkable two years ago, highlights the
deteriorating condition of Israeli-Turkish ties. In recent months, major
missteps by Israeli policy-planners have threatened to jeopardize the vital
military and political bonds developed between the two countries since the
mid-1990s. One such error was Israel’s abrupt and reckless unilateral
withdrawal from Lebanon in May of this year, which, though touted
domestically as an Israeli victory, was in fact a major strategic blunder,
calling into question Israel’s commitment to its allies in the region and
increasing the threat level throughout northern Israel and the Haifa region.
Of even greater
significance has been the Israeli government’s continued preoccupation
with the Oslo process, which has increased tensions with Turkey on what may
very well be the central issue between the two countries – water. When
Syria signaled its desire to resume negotiations earlier this year, it
resulted in a flurry of diplomatic activity aimed at rejuvenating the
stalled Israel-Syria peace track. Syrian demands for control over the Golan
Heights, and by extension its critical water resources (including the Sea of
Galilee, which provides Israel with thirty percent of its water), led State
Department officials to attempt a deal whereby Israel would be compensated
with Turkish water for its withdrawal from the Golan, as well as enlisting
Turkey to provide additional water to Syria as an alternative. While strong
and vocal Turkish opposition caused U.S. officials to back down, Israel’s
acquiescence to American pressure on Ankara seriously frayed Israeli-Turkish
ties.
Ongoing talks
between the two countries regarding the purchase of water have been another
point of discord and frustration for Ankara. Israel’s antiquated and
irresponsible policy of providing subsidies to its agricultural sector,
which currently receives in excess of 60% of Israel’s annual water while
providing less than 3% of its GNP, has forced the country to overexploit its
available resources. The results have been disastrous – according to
Israel’s water monopoly, Mekorot, the water situation in Israel could
worsen in 2001, even taking into account a proposed 50% cutback in the
quotas of fresh water provided to Israeli farmers. The gravity of this
crisis led Environment Minister Dalia Itzik to warn in July that “[w]ithin
three or four months, and especially next year, if there is drought this
winter we might have no water in the taps, but what there is will be
undrinkable.” In attempts to combat the country’s deepening water
crisis, Israeli policymakers have begun to explore drastic measures for
water procurement, foremost among them the purchase of water from Turkey.
But Jerusalem, failing to appreciate the importance of this issue in its
relations with Ankara, has been slow to finalize the importation of Turkish
water.
Israel’s
indecision has had dramatic results. In July, Israel’s bids to provide the
Turkish military with advanced attack helicopters were rejected, with Ankara
opting instead to award the $4.5 billion contract to the U.S. firm Bell
Textron. The same month, the Turkish government decided against granting
Israeli Military Industries (IMI) a $1 billion tank modernization and
upgrade program. Then in August, Turkey signaled that it would not purchase
Israel’s $254 million dollar Ofek spy satellite, instead reopening a
tender to international bidders. All told, Israel has lost in excess of $5
billion dollars in cancelled defense contracts with Turkey to date, a major
blow to its defense industry and a clear signal of the cooling of the
once-vibrant Israeli-Turkish military relationship.
But the current downturn in Turkish-Israeli ties is still reversible. A
quick agreement over the importation of high-quality, reasonably priced
Turkish fresh water would do much to restore stability to the strategic
relationship between the two countries. Indeed, cooperation between
Jerusalem and Ankara on water issues can serve not only to alleviate
Israel’s looming water crisis, but also as the basis for expanded regional
cooperation, both political and military. To date, however, the current
Israeli government, preoccupied with the escalating conflict in its
territories and a growing struggle for political power on the domestic
front, has neglected the interests of its strategic ally and partner. By
doing so, Israel increasingly risks alienating Turkey – and thereby
dramatically altering the balance of power in the region.
_________________________________________
Ilan
Berman is a Washington-based foreign policy
consultant. Paul Michael Wihbey is Strategic
Fellow at The Institute for Advanced Strategic & Political Studies,
Washington D.C. They are the
authors of a recent study on the role
of water in Middle East politics.
