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The
Fragile Saudi Regime
The sudden drop in oil prices is having
serious impact on Saudi fiscal and economic policies
for 2002. According to a December 5th Reuters
dispatch, "Saudi Arabia's chronic budget deficit
is expected to worsen in 2002 as weak oil prices hit
the world's biggest oil exporter...."
According to chief economist Saeed al-Sheikh at the
National Commercial Bank, the largest bank in Saudi
Arabia, "The drop in oil prices will cut revenues
significantly which will leave us with yet another
deficit, but a big one this time...." Indeed, in
its 2001 annual report on economic trends in Saudi
Arabia, the U.S. embassy in Riaydh projected that
Saudi GNP would decrease by close to $20 billion from
the 2000 level of $173 billion. The report forecasted
that per capita GDP levels would decline by $1000 to
$6800 in 2001 (by contrast, in 1981, that figure stood
at $28,600).
Combined with an estimated unemployment rate of 30%
and a literate young male population that has been
imbued with the teachings of militant religious
educators, difficult times lay ahead for Saudi Arabia.
In order to cope with massive undeclared off-budget
expenditures which distort the official numbers for
deficit spending estimated at $5 billion for 2001, it
will be difficult for Saudi Arabia to cut overall
spending in order to meet fiscal criteria that would
bring the economy into line.
If oil prices maintain themselves in the $17/b- $23/b
range for a protracted period of time and if Saudi
Arabia cannot reduce subsidies, its bloated
bureaucracy, and interest payments on the debt
(domestic debt is 107% of GDP), the stability of the
regime may be undermined by internal opposition
forces, who will argue that the continuing fiscal and
economic mismanagement of the Saudi regime negates its
legitimacy as a governing authority. Such perception
combined with radical Islamic ideological impulses
within the country represent a real danger to the
regime.
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