Recent
Noteworthy Developments
By Paul Michael
Wihbey
December 4, 1999
Russia and the Caspian:
The recent OSCE summit in Istanbul was marked
by a new demarcation line of emerging geopolitical significance between a newly
assertive Russia and the United States. This confrontation marks an historic
turning point in US-Russian relations within the context of the post-Cold War
era. In fact, just prior to the summit, Russian declaratory policy was
enunciated by no less a figure than Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, speaking on
behalf of the Russian leadership, “The
West’s policy is a challenge to Russia with the aim of weakening its
international position and ousting it from strategically important regions of
the world, above all the Caspian region, trans-Caucasus and Central Asia.”
[Fox News, November 12, 1999] This
statement was backed by clear and ominous signals to the West that Russia has
revised its policy in order to counter US involvement in the Caspian
energy-producing region, including;
·
Test-firing
two SS-21 short-range missiles to protest the US intention to abrogate the ABM
treaty in favor of a defensive missile shield
·
Test-firing
several submarine-based launches of nuclear-capable missiles with a range of
3,000 miles
·
Attacks
by Russian helicopter gunships, firing unguided missiles and machine guns,
inside the territory of Georgia near the town of Shatili [location of a key
border-control installation]
·
Stated
intention by the head of Russia’s long-range aviation forces to resume
long-range bomber flights to Cuba and Vietnam
Russia’s
new doctrine of an aggressive geopolitical posture resulted in urgent national
security discussions at the White House, which stemmed from the realization that
not only was US interest in the Caspian being threatened but larger US global
and strategic issues were at stake, including the ABM amendment. Despite direct
talks between Clinton and Yeltsin in Istanbul and before that with the Russian
Prime Minister Putin in Norway, the Administration failed to secure concessions
from Russia in its military campaign to subjugate Chechnya. The White House,
despite the signing of inter-governmental agreements to build the Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline at the OSCE summit, is now groping to redefine its policy towards
Russia, as well as its over-arching geopolitical objectives throughout the
Caucasus and Central Asia. The war in Chechnya is multi-dimensional since it
serves a host of Russian national security needs, including the domination of
the Caspian region, redressing the strategic nuclear balance with the United
States, and undermining US interests in the Middle East. Finally, due in no
small part to IASPS output on this issue, the mainstream media is finally
beginning to take notice. “But the war
has another aim: Yeltsin and company want to regain control of the North
Caucasus in order to make sure that Russia plays a decisive role in the
transportation of Caspian oil and gas. There is growing Russian resentment over
the US backing for the Eurasian energy corridor, the two pipelines that are
planned to carry Caspian oil and gas to Western markets through Turkey.” [Lally
Weymouth, Washington Post, November 29, 1999]
The
Russian drive southward, exemplified by the Russian military campaign in
Chechnya and increasing stress on the southern Caucasus states of Georgia and
Azerbaijan, was correctly evaluated in IASPS
Research Papers in Strategy nol.,
8 (April 1999):“The Southern Eurasian Great Game.” Note this drive took
place at the same time the United States was pursuing a policy of funding the
Russian treasury with great amounts of IMF funds. The hope or policy was Russia
would use this money to pursue US national security objectives relating to arms
control and economic development. US policy has clearly failed.
The
question of ‘who lost Russia’ will be debated by scholars, perhaps many of
the same ones who supported the funding policy,
in the years to come. But one thing is clear now:
Russia can no longer be considered a
third-rate transitional state. The United States seriously needs to re-evaluate
its relationship with Russia and the focus of that re-assessment must take place
within the framework of US and Allied interests in the Caspian region.
Iran and the Caspian:
The
signing of the pipeline protocols by Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and
Turkmenistan to build oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian to Turkey provoked
vehement protest from Iran. The Iranians recognized that these agreements, if
implemented, would cut out Iran and lessen the dependence of the Central Asian
states on Iran’s strategic ally, Russia. An eloquent statement to this effect
was issued through the official Iranian news agency, IRNA, on November 19th.
“By excluding Iran and
Russia, the United States is exacting revenge on Iran for its opposition to the
injustices perpetrated by Washington and Tel Aviv against the indigenous people
of Palestine…Washington is also trying to further weaken the Russian economy
by depriving it of potential revenues from pipeline transit fees and in the
process help Turkey to recover its losses resulting from the closure of its
pipeline through Iraq.”
The
Iranian statement seems to be a genuine reflection of the hostility generated in
Teheran against a nascent American attempt to undermine the geostrategic
blueprint that Iran and Russia have agreed upon with respect to joint hegemony
over the Caspian and Persian Gulf energy-producing regions. The Iranians are
lobbying hard to subvert the Baku-Ceyhan energy corridor.
What they want instead, is their own pipeline option that runs from the
Caspian to Iranian terminals on the Persian Gulf. Several major oil companies,
including Shell and Conoco, are pressuring the Administration to lift sanctions
on Iran in the hopes of securing concessions to the Iranian oil sector and,
possibly
involving themselves in the lucrative pipeline alternative for the delivery of
Caspian oil. “Conoco does not believe
any western company should be punished unilaterally by the United States for
participating in the economy of Iran. We do believe that such economic
engagement is vital in order to restore relations between our two governments.
Reports of the participation by Shell once again illustrate that the US
unilateral sanctions policy only serves to eliminate US companies from global
competition and do not achieve the effect desired by Washington.”
[Statement by A.W. Dunham, Conoco Chairman & CEO, Business Wire, November
15, 1999]
Summation:
The signing of
the pipeline agreements in Istanbul between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Turkmenistan, during the OSCE summit, is an important but tentative step forward
to a new regional architecture. This aim is the essence of Western strategic
interest. IASPS has stressed this point, in connection with others dealing with
the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Guinea, as the main theme of our Caspian
project.
Still,
the Great Game continues unabated. Russia
and its allies, notably Iran, Iraq and Syria, now have a coherent campaign to
blunt and eventually eliminate Western influences throughout southern Eurasia.
The recent decision by Iraq to cease oil exports, even temporarily, is a
tremendous boost for Russian oil revenues, and it is likely that this Iraqi
decision was taken in consultation with Saddam’s Russian advisers residing in
Baghdad.
Similarly,
the recent report from the Israeli GSS that Hizbullah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad
are training in Russia, and that the Syrian air force has used Mig-23s to
live-test chemical-capable bombs [Washington
Times, November 30, 1999] strongly
suggests that Israeli security as well as regional stability is being actively
targeted by the Russian/Iranian plan of action to re-assert regional
control. The Russian military and security establishments have effectively
resumed their authority over the Kremlin.
This is
a reaction to a perception of two things: one, that the United States is a
hostile and predatory power which seeks the break-up of the Russian Federation;
two: that the US for all its power is weakminded. This second observation is
based on the geopolitical realities of declining US strategic interests in the
Persian Gulf, tenuous American initiatives in the Caspian and Central Asia, and
recognition that US vision of Russia as a new liberal democracy hurtling towards
a free-market economy are unrealistic.
Russia's
place in US policy was the subject of IASPS
Strategic Fellow Wihbey’s recent remarks at the annual Assembly of Turkish
American Associations Convention in Washington.
“I
believe Russia, with Chinese support will take advantage of an emerging security
vacuum to extend its influence back into the Southern Eurasian heartland. Other
contributing factors to this strategic impulse, I suggest, involve the
perception of neo-isolationist tendencies in the United States; an American
unwillingness to accept further deployments (i.e., East Timor); a risk-averse US
Administration reluctant to take further foreign policy initiatives during the
presidential electoral-cycle, and; Moscow’s exploitation of domestic Russian
popular sentiment demanding retribution for recent terrorist bombings.”
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