There are several processes that have been true throughout and are permanent characteristics of the Israeli political economy. Israeli leaders were concerned that the individual citizens may be too weak, too greedy or too egotistical to work for the community and be subservient to the community rules. They therefore created strong central institutions that would limit the liberty of the individual to work for selfish objectives, and attempted to make sure that all individuals are obedient to the rules. This was achieved in the non-sovereign period of the Yishuv by centralized mobilization and allocation of resources. Moreover, the resources were mobilized from outside the constituents, therefore the problem of willingness to pay was less severe. It was also achieved by making individuals and individual organizations subject to rules of the game, designed to make the center decide for all of the members.
These rules of the game were naturally transformed when the sovereignty of the state became a reality. Yet the individual citizen was still expected to be subservient to the national needs, the government mobilized most of the resources and allocated more resources than it collected from the citizens. Most of the time, leaders totally disregarded economic calculations on deciding on what was perceived as a 'heroic' national project. Despite myths, the reason for this behavior was not that there was no other way to achieve such lofty national goals as the defense of the country and the absorption of the immigrants. The reasons were ideological and political. These beliefs led to another distinguishing characteristic of the Israeli economy - the exceptionally large and prominent role of the government, and the dependence of citizens on government.
Government's Role in the Economy
The history of the Israeli economy points to continued increasing political influence on the economic system. Such political intervention occurred with preferences given to selected economic sectors, while ignoring market forces. Israeli governments, irrespective of their ideological leanings, never pursued policies leading to economic efficiency or to the operation of a free market economy. Political leaders believed that capital and labor markets were inadequately developed. They thought that given the infant state of Israeli industry, these markets could not be relied upon to achieve economic development on their own.
Moreover, most political leaders perceived private wealth as theft and private greed was seen as anathema. The economy of Israel is very much politically dominated, in which total dependence changed into interdependence and to a government which is prisoner of its close relations with and past promises to different interest groups, with a national consensus calling for the achievement of too many tasks without any attempt to decide on priorities.
The leaders of the Zionist movement were in the main indelibly East European intellectuals. They spoke several languages fluently, possessing great eloquence and a high degree of intelligence. Most of them held several university degrees. They were all men of ability in their particular professions. They were not religious, and also had lost hope for the possibility of assimilation. The center of the organization was in Europe and its leaders only visited Eretz Israel once in a while. Only a few were West Europeans, and even fewer were Americans. Many of these leaders had a note of worldliness and elegance about them, always fashionably dressed, even with frock coats.
A cleavage between 'east' and 'west' appeared several times in the history of the Zionist movement, since the time Herzl proposed to substitute Uganda for Palestine, failing to understand the fixation of Jews on Eretz Israel and their inability to transfer their longings and dreams to another country, even as a temporary palliative measure. American Zionist leaders, headed by Judge Brandeis, disagreed with the East European Jews on the role of Keren Hayesod. Both sides realized that the country had been neglected for generations. They were fully aware of the fact that its good soil had been washed into the sea and the valleys, and the reconstruction of the land to regain what had been destroyed, or the draining of the marshes could not be done unless they could be financed by national capital. They differed on the means of achieving these shared objectives.
Weizmann was able to overcome Brandeis' resistance to a centralized organization. The synergy between leaders like Dr. Chaim Weizmann or Dr. Arthur Ruppin and the leaders of the labor movement created a cooperation system in which the pioneers were those expected to carry out the national development policies. Those opposing this cooperation were against the basic paternalistic and centralist system, created at that time and continued to this very day.
The covenant between the labor pioneers and the Zionist leaders meant that direction and intervention would increase. First, in order for the Zionist Organization to help the pioneers, who had zest and indefatigable energy but no funds and skills, the organization had to direct these persons, teach them and guide them in minute detail. Second, for the experiment to have any probability of success, people had to accept the preference granted to the labor communal settlements and the undaunted denial of funds to the private sector. Third, they had to accept that Jewish labor, despite its higher costs, should receive preference, and Jewish produce, again despite its higher costs, should be preferred to the cheaper Arab produce. These types of preferences are far from possible if one believes in the superiority of a free market economy.
For Ruppin, solitary settlers or a small village could not have survived in the face of the innumerable difficulties in Palestine. As he saw it, only the communal settlers could maintain themselves in the unsettled and remote parts of the country and their apostolic devotion could compensate for the lack of skills. The soil, neglected and abused for centuries, could be restored only in such a communal and unselfish effort. Since he (and others) believed that an agricultural base was the only way to create a new Jewish culture, he needed the pioneers to do the job. Other leaders were advocating development of towns and manufacturing, but their way was not accepted. This is not to say that cities were not built. In fact, city populations were always the majority.
The labor pioneers were able, because of their superb political organization and their agreements with Weizmann and the religious parties, to achieve a hegemony position in the Yishuv political structure. Ben Gurion became the leader of the Zionist Organization in 1935, and Labor continued to lead the movement (and the government) until 1977. For Mapai leaders, intervention was not only acceptable, but ideologically sanctioned. With time, the bureaucracy learned to enjoy the power of intervention and to behave as if they knew best what was good for the citizen.
The question of the degree of government involvement or that of the possibility to rely more on market forces was never allowed to be tested empirically. A national economy, unlike a chemical laboratory, is not an entity on which people like to make experiments when they believe the probability of success is extremely low. One important junction from this point of view was when the Federal Republic of Germany agreed to pay Israel reparations. At that time, Israel again opted for a centralized political system, not for market allocation. The ramifications of this intervention on the degree of dependence of individuals and therefore on the ability of entrepreneurs to flourish was never widely appreciated. The leaders of that time distrusted the market and viewed profits as rewards to parasitism. The Histadrut pension funds refused to invest their reserves in land, always considered an inflation hedge, because this was considered 'speculation.'
The Israeli government controls the intermediation between private savers and investors, using domination to make investment decisions, despite a long history of constant misallocation of investment resources. The first finance ministers - Eliezer Kaplan, Levi Eshkol and Pinhas Sapir - enjoyed a significant level of political power and were totally autonomous in the determination and execution of economic policies. These three created a system of almost total identity between political and economic power, that reached its apex in the system of improvisation and a detailed and particular intervention on an ad hoc basis perfected by Pinhas Sapir. When Yehoshua Rabinowitz became a Finance Minister he used more independent experts in planning economic changes such as a tax reform system. Yet the political control of the economic system continued and the structure of the economy remained intact.
This high level of political involvement was a major characteristic also of the governments created by the Likud parties. One result of government dominance has been a total dependence of most business firms on the government. The many who found the system intolerable (and some of them may have been potentially great entrepreneurs) did not invest in Israel, or moved to other countries, in which they sometimes were extremely successful. With time, some large business firms became less dependent on government funds, having accumulated more capital through retained earnings. One-sided dependence was gradually altered to a system of interdependence and of give and take within wide boundaries of an establishment.
The establishment includes not only the government but also the managers of the large firms in the three major sectors of the economy - having a sort of old-boy network. There are very high barriers to entry into that group and the economic system has remained highly politicized, keeping the newcomers, the small entrepreneurs and those unknown to it outside the establishment. One result is that it is extremely difficult for persons with new, daring and innovative ideas to get these ideas accepted. Since a free market does not exist, these persons cannot try the new ideas on their own, and civil servants are quite wary of trying unconventional ideas. Even consumers' protection institutions were financed (and their managers were nominated) by the political leaders in the government or in the Histadrut. Israel does not have independent non-civil service regulatory bodies, and too independent persons would not be nominated as directors in the state-owned enterprises. These positions are held as a source of political patronage and as means to repay political debts.
Despite a wider recognition that market forces may be a better means for resource allocation decisions, government bureaucracy and politicians found it extremely hard to give up even a little bit of their cherished power. Despite much preaching, government intervention deepened; and the diverse methods of the intervention continued, irrespective of the party of power. Government intervention shifted from rationing, ad hoc decisions and administrative controls to the control of virtually all sources of capital and their administrative allocation at varying rates of subsidy.
To a large extent, it is inappropriate to use a term like intervention when one considers the Israeli situation. The Israelis have always believed in cooperation and in mutual assistance. The seeds of the Israeli political economic system were sown during the 1920s. Since then, the system has been characterized by an extremely high degree of centralization and political arrangements and agreements on the allocation of public capital. The system was also based on a pluralistic economic system in which public, private and Histadrut sectors (and in the Yishuv period - a separate religious sector) coexist. The criteria for the existence of an economic entity were never its efficiency or its competitive strength. Rather, it was the ability of the unit to create employment. Israel also attempted to shield business firms from competition, thus creating a business culture in which export based on competitive advantage is neither nourished nor preferred.
In addition, the Israeli managers have learned that the success of the firms they head depends more on governmental decisions than on their success in navigating the firm to the right strategy in the marketplace. The government has learned that it depends on the business activities of some firms in attempting to achieve its goals and thus the two sides became interdependent. The Israeli economists dealt mainly in macroeconomic problems and both the business managers and the government failed to understand the meaning of these economic models. There was also a strong belief in the superiority of egalitarian society and in the desirability of avoidance of a class system. This avoidance was achieved to some extent by rotating managerial jobs.
In this type of an economic system, many entrepreneurs have always been institutional rather than individualistic, working for increased power, for the glory of their sector and for the expansion of the size of the firms they managed. Finally, the system had a heavy dose of political and security dimensions. In fact, political parties controlled the economic resource allocation.
For such an economic system to work, there were several important prerequisites. First, individuals had to be willing (or to be coerced to accept) to pay higher than world market prices for domestically manufactured goods. These goods could then be produced even at inefficient or non-world competitive prices, allowing the owners to pay the workers comparatively high wages. During the Yishuv period, this was achieved by an ideology emphasizing the importance of building a new economic base, and therefore strong social pressures to prefer more expensive Jewish-made products.
Second, there was a need for a large influx of capital that would allow enough resources to be used - and in which uses did not have to be equal to domestically produced sources. As long as the additional resources came from grants that did not have to be repaid, the question of the efficient allocation of resources could conveniently be ignored. Once the deficit had to be financed from loans, the ability to repay these loans had to be considered, but politicians could always conveniently postpone this consideration.
Third, the political system (and later the government) had to hold a tight grip on all sources of foreign funds and the intermediation between savers and investors. Fourth, the system necessitated a homogeneous population of persons willing to sacrifice private gains for the achievement of national goals, and ready to deprive themselves of all sorts of benefits in order to achieve various ends.
Since much of the funds at the disposal of the government came from outside, and since there was a widespread feeling that the government would bail out those who might fail and help each individual to get a higher standard of living, the system could continue even though the new generation believed in a very different ideology. This new generation readily and willingly got used to being a government clientele. In fact, individuals learned to expect the government to supply them with many services. Since those living in Israel today are not the pioneers but their descendants or newcomers, there is very little role left to the ideology. Individuals have very high expectations regarding the level of services they can expect from the government. Many escalated their demands for both more and wider array of government services. Every year, these demands intensified, and the ability of the government to supply all these needs with total disregard to costs have shrunk. Still, to this date the intervention of the government in every aspect of economic life in Israel is greater than in any noncommunist country in the world.
Being a coalition, the government was turned into a set of feudal estates of the different ministers, each one attempting to get and increase the largesse for those who voted for him or in whose value he believed. In this system there was no economic planning or strategy. Ministers generally believed that it was only the finance minister who should worry about the budget and its balancing. None of them were willing to cut the budget they were responsible for or even to reduce the many duplications among many ministers by giving up a function or a department.
The legislative body has had very little influence on the resource allocation. The absolute control of the capital market and its ability to tap foreign funds allowed the government to achieve at one and the same time political-economic objectives, security goals, social justice missions and absorption of immigration. Most political leaders ignored any economic constraints and refused to take into account any economic reports that may have cast doubt on the economic justification of their cherished activities. They were unwilling to decide on priorities. The general consensus has been that Israel must achieve all goals simultaneously. At least until mid-1985, the driving force was the vision and the political will, not the cold economic calculations and the budget constraints.
A Guilt Complex
The final persistent theme related closely to that of the government's role is that of shame in any desire to have a better quality of life. Perhaps because of the long reign of the ideology, Israelis often suffer from a guilt complex. Throughout the period of modern settlement in Israel-starting with the Yishuv period and continuing uninterruptedly in the years of the state - political leaders, leading economists and influential newspapermen joined in giving the average citizen a guilt complex. Citizens were told they should be ashamed for wanting to consume more, that only such an irresponsibility causes the country to be in a bad economic state. The citizen should not prefer an imported and much cheaper Australian butter to the more expensive Tnuva butter lest Jewish farmers should go bankrupt. The citizen must refrain from even dreaming of owning such luxury items as a washing machine or a refrigerator. The definition of what is or is not a luxury item came, of course, from a government official, who also tried to explain to the North African Jews that they should change their eating habits and move to eat what so appropriately was called 'uniform' bread. Items such as furs were for some reason not considered luxury.
Portnoy's Jewish mother set the pattern, and most leaders continued in building up the guilt complex. Newspaper articles accused the public of being too greedy and too consumption conscious. The failures of the political leaders were less well recorded. Yet most of the reasons for the scarcity of certain goods or for the continuation of a large import surplus or for the zooming of the country's foreign debt were not that the citizens were irresponsible.
If anything, the Israeli citizens were both responsible and docile. They paid one of the highest rates of taxes in the world, they served in reserve duty an endless number of days, they were willing to work hard for relatively low wages (and were constantly told by economists that their wages were too high!). They also saved. In fact, private savings in Israel have always been high, increasing from 22 per cent of GNP in 1955-62, to 28.8 per cent in 1963-72, and 35.3 per cent in 1973-7. Since then, savings have been reduced to 30.6 per cent in 1978-82 and to 20-27 per cent later.
To be sure, Israeli citizens attempted to find small means to protect themselves from a constant barrage of governmental directives and to anticipate the next (and frequent) change in these policies before it occurred. In short, they attempted to be rational human beings. The government, in turn, behaved as if it was omnipotent. The government also designed a hundred and one ways to discriminate among its citizens. The Ministry of Housing did not simply help a citizen to acquire a house. It had regulations on the location of the house, the size of the flat, and the materials used in the construction. These were related to the number of children, the income of the parents and many other variables. New immigrants to Israel were allowed to bring many household goods exempt from customs.
They were not exempt from going through all kinds of bureaucratic mazes in order to implement these rights. Even in the middle of the 1980s, the Ministry of Housing attempted to allow a new immigrant to receive government participation in rent only if the flat were less than a certain size. The general rule has always been: the leaders know best, the political party has all the wisdom, the private citizen should be disciplined. Certainly, he should not look for even legitimate loopholes. Anita Shapira, an historian of the period, often emphasized that the leaders despised the masses.4
The government also dissaved. Until 1966, its deficit averaged less than 4 per cent of GNP. Between the 1967 war and 1972, it was 15 per cent. After the 1973 war, it jumped to over 30 per cent in 1973-5. Between 1975 and 1984, it ranged from 20-27 per cent. The government deficit only saw a serious drop in mid-1985.
While the ordinary citizen suffered from excessive bureaucracy, high taxes and need for licenses for almost anything, some privileged individuals were exempt from taxes or the need for licensing and often received government largesse. One can give many examples of largesse: allowance of a larger per cent of construction rights out of the land if a construction firm agrees to sell a certain number of flats to young couples, subsidies to public transportation, a cartel for the marketing of fuel, taxi licenses, import licenses, a large number of unrealistic rates of exchange, and so on.
As one small example, in the summer of 1983, the Knesset enacted a law forbidding deceit in Kashrut. Of course, no one lied on Kashrut before, and fraud has always been illegal. But the law allowed the religious parties many more patronage jobs. This law gave the Chief Rabbinate monopoly power to grant Kashrut certificates. Places of business had to pay for Rabbinical supervision, so that the certificate would be granted. The irony of the law was that the extremely pious ultra-Orthodox Jews would not recognize the supervision of the Chief Rabbinate and have their own supervision organizations. The costs are paid by the secular individuals.
While these trends have been persistent, there were also important changes. The 1977 elections results were to many the first sign of the political change. This change, however, had long roots in many ideological, social and cultural changes.
The Six Days' War, which left Israel in control of a million and a half Arabs, led to many questions. The unification of the various political centers of power under Mapai hegemony was replaced by multiple political power centers after the upheaval of 1977. The rapid pace of economic growth ceased and was replaced by stagnation. It was recognized that, being a tiny open economy in a global setting, Israel could not continue its existence based on a constant flow of capital grants.
If the country were going to pay its own way, it would have to mold new institutions capable of competing in the world market, and to promote a belief system recognizing the need for global competitiveness. Such a system may simply be based on unfettered market operations. It could also retain the spirit of cooperation as long as the need for world class efficiency is recognized. This system may be possible because of the many gradual changes and some of the major discontinuities that can be identified in Israel.
Some Discontinuities: The Changing Reality
The generation of pioneers who came from Eastern Europe was united in its ideological proclivities. Their ideology was nurtured from the socialist beliefs of Eastern Europe. In the Yishuv period, leaders and other pioneers spent their years in endless debates among various points of view on the vision of the nation they were to build and the meaning of their life. They had a strong and continuous sense of mission. For them, those who had different views were arch-enemies, who should be ostracized from any duty, and boycotted with contempt.
The Zionist movement called on individuals to place themselves at the disposal of the community in order to serve national goals, sacrificing private interests. Some of the movements extended this requirement to all walks of life; others emphasized the importance of national goals only on issues related to defense or to political objectives. For them, the allegiance to the nation did not include the economic sphere. Later, the disappointment with the anti-democratic manifestations of the USSR moved Israel to create a western state, an ally of the United States. The ideology shifted, and its base was deteriorating. It was not shared by the second and third generation, who have been great believers in pragmatism. The power of the search for a new Jew has dimmed. Now Israelis look for a higher standard of living or a higher social status.
Many of the new generation in Israel look to North America for inspiration. Most economists in Israel are trained by the Chicago school tradition and believe passionately in the superiority of the free market system. Often, this belief is mingled with socialist slogans, still remembered from earlier participation in the Youth Movement's activities. The institutions of Israel, however, are those molded and shaped by the forefathers according to their ideological beliefs and needs.
As one example, moshavim in Israel are subject to a law that gives all power and prerogatives to the moshav association, with very little discretion to the individual member. Many of the young generation feel this is wrong, but none were able to rebel effectively to force a change in the law or the regulations. Another example is the system of elections - both in the country and within the political parties. Already elections within parties have begun to be made under different, more democratic and participative, rules from the 1980s. Young Israelis would also hope to see changes in the proportional representation system.
Many Israeli social scientists emphasize the central position of ideology as an engine moving the first generation. Many leaders in Israel were portrayed as preoccupied with ideological controversies. Many of the economic achievements are attributed to a high level of motivation, stemming from ideology. Medding, who studied the operations of Mapai, concluded that its control was based on consensual agreement, that is, on its ability to mediate among various social groups achieving consensus. 5 Yonathan Shapiro emphasizes the role of a ruling elite, believing this oligarchy gained control of the political party and the Histadrut and used this control to achieve dominance.6
Conclusions
Israel, toward the 1990s, is not a country with a free market liberal economy, rather a state in which much of the resources are allocated by the government in different ways. Israel's economy is subservient to its political system and to its national objectives. Much of this is a heritage of the voluntary system created in the pre-state period, that was carried over to the state. In the formative years of the state, the first priority had to be given to physical survival in the face of constant infiltration by Arab guerrillas and a frontal attack in every possible international forum attempting to undermine the very existence of the country and destroy it.
In addition, the wide opening of Israel's gates to the 684,000 new immigrants that arrived between May 1948 and December 1951 strained all resources. These resources had to be concentrated on an attempt to supply the massive influx of people shelter, food and employment and prevent major health hazards. There was no way to achieve all these goals without a decisive governmental intervention and direct action.
The economic policy of 1985, while badly needed to stabilize the economic system, also injected for the first time in Israel's history some market discipline. The belief system of most economic leaders did not change fast enough to allow them to read the change and adjust to it. By the end of 1989, many business firms in Israel, in particular in the Histadrut sector were facing many difficulties and struggling to survive. The young generation of Israel has different ideals and does not identify with the old symbols. More than 50 percent of those under 24 voted for the Likud.
The labor leaders failed to implement or even to initiate the fundamental changes called for, perhaps because they did not fully understand the factors that led to their failure. Yet without major changes it would be extremely difficult to invigorate Israel and put the country on a growth path. The political contest between the Likud and Labor has become one of a major disagreement on the shaping of the social fabric of Israel. Many of the old values, even that of the importance of work, has been delegitimized. New values have yet to emerge.
Most economists in Israel preach the supremacy of a free market. Yet, the economy is strongly influenced by a centralized political control, and social institutions are geared more for consensus via compromise than to the competition of the free market. Civil servants who enjoy their high level of power attempt to control the economy. Israel still has to adapt itself to the new environment and achieve a new consensus. Hopefully, this will be one that will recognize the very important need to achieve competitive advantage in the world arena in order to achieve some degree of economic independence.
Israel, in the 1990s, needs to make some important strategic choices. It cannot afford to continue operations based on the assumption of 'things as usual' and rely on foreign donors to supply a significant percent of its resources. To achieve economic growth coupled with social equity, Israel must increase its exports, and reduce the level of government intervention in its economy. The magnitude of the task would be more manageable if the defense budget could be drastically reduced, or if many more affluent immigrants would flock to the country's shores.
Israeli society was transformed, and some of its institutions are now somewhat outmoded. To survive into the 21st century, Israel will have to revamp the institutions created by the founding generation and move to an economy in which only firms able to compete in the world market will survive. Alternatively, a new consensus may be achieved that firms must be internationally competitive, that all segments of society are in the same boat and everyone must help to pull the oars for economic, and therefore political, independence to be achieved.
A cooperative resolution of conflicts over economic and social issues is more in line with the history and belief system of Israel. In the past, Israel emphasized employment creation and tolerated the existence of firms that could not compete in a world market. Israel also allowed a large level of disguised unemployment to continue. In the 1990s, cooperation will be needed to achieve a major structural change, allowing firms to exist only if they can compete in the world arena. Some institutions, forged in earlier periods to fit the needs and the prevailing ideology of that time, are ill suited to cope with new conditions and may have to be razed.
Israeli politics has been governed by splits, the tendency for divisiveness, rifts and personal quarrels. At the same time Israel is also to a large extent a monolithic body. The fear of a total cataclysm and utter destruction pushed the Israelis to be always prepared to devote themselves to achieve national goals, to sacrificing their own personal needs and to a considerable space of solidarity and decisiveness in anything related to the national survival. Despite many debates and controversies, Israelis have a clear set of agreed national goals, and the public interest and community needs are perceived as having priority over any individual benefits.
One major lesson of Israel's experience is that a nation can create for itself dynamic competitive advantages in the world markets by a high level of investment in human capital. The Israeli experience seems to show that raw materials or cheap labor are not the only means of achieving economic growth. In fact, much of the growth can be achieved if a nation invests in the creation of new knowledge and skills, and if firms are innovative in designing strategies which introduce to the world economy new products and new processes. Israel exports today a myriad of sophisticated products based on its own R&D efforts. Such economic growth can be achieved without a major social upheaval and while maintaining a democratic regime if there is a widely-held national consensus on the importance of certain goals and the willingness to work hard to achieve these goals.
Another important lesson of Israel is the limit to the ability of any individual to transform large communities to new ideals. Such transformations do not seem to hold in the third generation. Israel's pioneers were extremely optimistic. They believed community life could and should transform the basic nature of human beings by creating new economic and social arrangements. For these arrangements to work effectively, individuals must sacrifice private interests, placing themselves at the disposal of the community. Individuals should forget their desire for private property, suppress their greed and ignore their inclinations to work hard solely for themselves as individuals and for their close families. Instead, they should be committed to a collective growth. Israel's experience shows that such a commitment is possible for special reasons and for a limited time.
Yair Stern, who created Lehi, wrote that "we have enlisted in the cause for our entire life, only death will release us from the ranks." A few hundred followed him to the underground. Those surviving the underground period were released from their solemn oath by the state's independence and went their own way to take care of themselves as individuals. Private interests were sacrificed for some time by a few. The founders of the kibbutz felt such a metamorphosis was possible, even desirable. They also believed that rational behavior would win over any impulses.
They believed they could precipitate matters, suppress individualism and compel themselves to serve only the nation and the class. The two commitments were considered complementary. Most Israelis are motivated in their daily life by looking after their own good. The commitment to live only for nationalistic ideals has waned now that Israeli adults are into the third generation. The inability of Israeli society to maintain the same level of zeal toward national economic matters can be seen as the first omen, predicting the clamor in Eastern Europe in 1989. Even the Soviet Union had to move to reconstruct its economy despite the resistance of the old guard. To be sure, Israel has always been a democracy, and many would continue to live in a kibbutz and enjoy its unique model of community life. The third generation of Israelis, however, would rather see themselves in a market economy and with less dependency.
Yair Aharoni is Professor of International Business at the Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, the Issacher Haimovic Professor Emeritus of Business Policy at the Leon Racanati Graduate School of Business Administration, Tel-Aviv University, and a Policy Analyst at the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies.
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